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A bit string commitment protocol securely commits N classical bits in such a way that the
recipient can extract only M < N bits of information about the string. Classical reasoning might
suggest that bit string commitment implies bit commitment and hence, given the Mayers-Lo-Chau
theorem, that non-relativistic quantum bit string commitment is impossible. Not so: there exist
non-relativistic quantum bit string commitment protocols, with security parameters ǫ and M , that
allow A to commit N = N(M, ǫ) bits to B so that A’s probability of successfully cheating when
revealing any bit and B’s probability of extracting more than N ′ = N−M bits of information about
the N bit string before revelation are both less than ǫ. With a slightly weakened but still restrictive
definition of security against A, N can be taken to be O(exp(CN ′)) for a positive constant C. I
briefly discuss possible applications.
1 Present and permanent address.
I. INTRODUCTION
As is by now well known, quantum information can
guarantee classically unattainable security in a variety of
important cryptographic tasks. Some no-go results have
also been obtained, showing that quantum cryptography
cannot guarantee perfect security for every task. We do
not presently have a good characterisation of the tasks
for which perfectly secure quantum protocols exist. In
fact, we are not yet even able to characterise the range
of cryptographic tasks for which perfectly secure quan-
tum protocols might possibly exist. The main reason is
that quantum cryptography involves more than devising
quantum protocols for tasks known to be useful in clas-
sical cryptography. The properties of quantum informa-
tion allow one to devise new and cryptographically use-
ful tasks, which have no classical counterpart. Moreover,
reductions and relations between classical cryptographic
tasks need not necessarily apply to their quantum equiv-
alents. This means that there is a wider range of tasks
to consider, and that no-go theorems may not necessarily
be quite as powerful as classical reasoning would suggest.
These remarks apply particularly to bit commitment,
an important cryptographic protocol whose potential for
physically secure implementation has been extensively
investigated [1–12]. It is known that unconditionally
secure quantum bit commitment is impossible for non-
relativistic protocols [4–8]: that is, protocols in which
the two parties are restricted to single pointlike sites, or
more generally, in which the signalling constraints of spe-
cial relativity are ignored. On the other hand, uncondi-
tionally secure bit commitment is thought to be possible
between parties controlling appropriately separated pairs
of sites, when the impossibility of superluminal signalling
is taken into account. [10,11]
While sustaining a bit commitment indefinitely via rel-
ativistic protocols is practical with current technology
[11], the constraints it imposes are not always desirable.
Both parties have to maintain separated secure locations,
and communications have to continue throughout the du-
ration of the commitment. A further motivation for con-
tinued study of non-relativistic protocols is that it is the-
oretically interesting to characterise which secure quan-
tum protocols can be implemented without relying on
relativity. With these motivations in mind, we restrict
attention to non-relativistic protocols in the rest of this
paper. Rather than insert the word “non-relativistic”
throughout, we generally take the restriction as under-
stood below.
Some variants of bit commitment, for which non-
relativistic protocols are not known to be impossible,
have previously been studied. [13,14] This paper consid-
ers a different type of generalisation, bit string commit-
ment, in which one party commits many bits to another
in a single protocol. Two non-relativistic bit string com-
mitment protocols, which offer classically unattainable
levels of security against cheating, are described.
II. BIT STRING COMMITMENT
Consider the following classical cryptographic prob-
lem. Two mistrustful parties, A and B, need a protocol
which will (i) allow A to commit a string a1a2 . . . an of
bits to B, and then, (ii) at any later time of her choice,
reveal the committed bits. The protocol should prevent
A from cheating, in the sense that she should have neg-
ligible chance of unveiling bits a′i different from the ai
without B being able to detect the attempted detection.
In other words, A should be genuinely committed after
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the first stage. The protocol should also prevent B from
being able to completely determine the bit string. More
precisely, it must guarantee that, before revelation, B
has little or no chance of obtaining more than m bits of
information about the committed string, for some fixed
integer m < n.
This (m,n) bit string commitment problem is a gen-
eralisation of the standard bit commitment problem, for
which n = 1 and m = 0. Clearly, a protocol for bit com-
mitment would solve this generalised problem, since the
protocol could be repeated n times to commit each of the
ai, and B would be able to obtain no information about
the committed string. Conversely, classical reasoning im-
plies that a protocol for the generalised problem, for any
integers m and n with m < n, could be used as a proto-
col for standard bit commitment. For A and B could use
any coding of a single bit a = f(a1, . . . , an) in terms the
n bit string such that none of the m bits available to B is
correlated with a, and then use the protocol to commit
A to a.
Classically, then, (m,n) bit string commitment is es-
sentially equivalent to bit commitment. At first sight,
allowing A and B to use quantum information may seem
to make no difference. But there are subtleties. One is
that extracting information from a quantum state can
generally be done in many different ways. Each of these
generally disturbs the quantum state, so that different
ways of information extraction are generally incompati-
ble: after method one has been applied, method two may
no longer give as much (or any) information. This leaves
open the possibility of bit string commitment protocols
in which B can obtain some m bits of information about
the committed n bit string in many different ways, with-
out A necessarily knowing which m bits of information
are obtained. A second subtlety is that if A commits
a mixed state, a protocol can leave her almost perfectly
committed to each bit in a string, in the sense that she
is essentially unable to vary the probabilities of revealing
0 or 1 for any given bit, while leaving the actual bit val-
ues undetermined until a measurement at the revelation
stage. For a long enough string, this might be doable in
such a way as to leave A almost completely uncommitted
to the value of some joint functions of the string bits.
Any attempt to use a secure quantum bit string proto-
col to commit a single bit by redundant coding could thus
fail: it could be that, for any given coding, either A or
B can cheat. In other words, there is no obvious equiv-
alence between quantum (m,n) bit string commitment
and quantum bit commitment. The impossibility of un-
conditionally secure quantum bit commitment does not
necessarily imply that unconditionally secure quantum
bit string commitment, with an analogous definition of
security, is impossible. We now show it can be achieved.
III. PROTOCOL 1
Define qubit states ψ0 = |0〉 and ψ1 = sin θ|0〉 +
cos θ|1〉. We take θ > 0 to be small; θ and r = n−m are
security parameters for the protocol.
Commitment: To commit a string a1 . . . an of
bits to B, A sends the qubits ψa1 , . . . , ψan , sequentially.
Unveiling: To unveil, A simply declares the values
of the string bits, and hence the qubits sent. Assuming
that B has not disturbed the qubits, he can test the bit
values a′i claimed by A at unveiling by measuring the
projection onto ψa′
i
on qubit i, for each i. If he obtains
eigenvalue 1 in each case, he accepts the unveiling as an
honest revelation of a genuine commitment; otherwise
he concludes A cheated. (As usual, we assume noiseless
channels.)
Security against A: Whatever strategy A fol-
lows, once she transmits the qubits to B, their respective
density matrices ρi are fixed. Let p
j
i = 〈ψj |ρi|ψj〉 be the
probability of B accepting a revelation of j for the i-th
bit. We have
p0i + p
1
i ≤ cos
2((π − 2θ)/4) + sin2((π + 2θ)/4) , (1)
which is ≤ 1 + θ for small θ. This is the standard def-
inition of security against A for an individual bit com-
mitment, with security parameter θ. In other words, A’s
scope for cheating on any bit of the string is limited to
slightly increasing the probability of revealing a 0 or 1,
by an amount ≤ θ, which can be made arbitrarily small
by choosing the security parameters appropriately. A is
committed to each individual bit, in this standard sense,
although of course the protocol does not prevent her com-
mitting quantum superpositions of bits or bit strings.
Security against B: We assume that prior to
commitment B has no information about the bit string:
to B, all string values are equiprobable. He thus has to
obtain information about a density matrix of the form
ρ = 2−n
∑
a1...an
|ψa1 . . . ψan〉〈ψa1 . . . ψan | . (2)
Holevo’s theorem [15] tells us that the accessible informa-
tion available to B by any measurement on ρ is bounded
by the entropy
S(ρ) = (H(
1 + sin θ
2
))n (3)
For any fixed θ > 0, we have S(ρ) < n. For any fixed r,
by taking n sufficiently large, we can ensure n−S(ρ) > r.
So we can ensure that, however B proceeds, on average
at least r bits of information about the string will remain
inaccessible to him.
By choosing n suitably large, we can also ensure that
the probability of B obtaining more than n − r bits of
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information about the string is smaller than any given
δ > 0. A simple bound follows from considering the
probability of B identifying all n bits. As each bit is
equiprobably 0 or 1, B’s probability of identifying it is
no more than H(1+sin θ2 ); his probability of identifying all
n is no more than (H(1+sin θ2 ))
n. If he obtains more than
n − r bits of information about the string, his probabil-
ity of identifying all n bits is greater than 2−r. Hence
δ ≤ 2r(H(1+sin θ2 ))
n.
IV. PROTOCOL 2
Protocol 1 ensures bit-wise security against A, but uses
a rather inefficient bit string coding which allows B to
obtain almost all of the bit string before revelation. For
large n, more efficient codings allow the security against
B to be greatly enhanced, though with a weakened no-
tion of security against A.
We again take the security parameter θ > 0 to be small
and write ǫ = sin θ. For any θ > 0 and sufficiently large
n, explicit constructions are known for sets v1, . . . , vf(n)
of vectors in Hn such that |〈 vi | vj 〉| < sin θ for all i 6= j,
with the property that f(n) = O(exp(Cn)), where C is a
positive constant that depends on θ. [16,17] (The use of
these constructions for efficient quantum coding of clas-
sical information has previously been noted by Buhrman
et al. [18], who describe efficient quantum fingerprint-
ing schemes which reduce communication complexity in
the simultaneous message passing model.) A string of
O(Cn) bits can thus be encoded by vectors in Hn, such
that the overlap between the code vectors for two distinct
strings is always less than sin θ, suggesting the following
bit string commitment protocol.
Commitment: Let N be the number of bits that
can be encoded in Hn by the above construction. To
commit a string a1 . . . aN of bits to B, A sends the state
va1...aN , treating the index as a binary number.
Unveiling: To unveil, A declares the values of the
string bits, and hence the state sent. Assuming B has not
disturbed the qubits, he can test A’s claim by measur-
ing the projection onto va1...aN . If he obtains eigenvalue
1, he accepts the unveiling as an honest revelation of a
genuine commitment; otherwise he concludes A cheated.
Security against A: As before, once A trans-
mits a quantum state to B, its density matrix ρ is fixed.
Consider some set i1, . . . , ir of bit strings which A might
wish to maintain the option of revealing after commit-
ment. Let Pi be the projection onto vi, let pi = Tr(ρPi)
be the probability of A successfully revealing string i, and
write
Q = Pi1 + . . .+ Pir . (4)
We want to bound Tr(ρQ) for any density matrix ρ.
This can be done by first maximising 〈Q〉w =
〈w|Q|w〉
〈w |w 〉 for
any vector |w〉. Writing |w〉 =
∑
j wj |vij 〉 + |v
⊥〉, where
〈 v⊥ | vij 〉 = 0 for j from 1 to r, clearly |v
⊥〉 = 0 max-
imises 〈Q〉w. So without loss of generality we can write
|w〉 =
∑
j wj |vij 〉 with
∑
j |wj |
2 = 1.
Now
〈Q〉w =
1 + 2S2 + S3
1 + S2
,
where
S2 =
∑
ij
w¯iwj(1 − δij)〈 vi | vj 〉
and
S3 =
∑
ijk
w¯iwk(1 − δij)(1− δjk)〈 vi | vj 〉〈 vj | vk 〉 .
The Cauchy-Schwarz inequality gives us that
S2 ≤ ǫ(r − 1) S3 ≤ ǫ
2(r − 1)2 .
Both bounds are simultaneously attainable, by setting
wj =
1√
r
for all j and 〈 vij | vik 〉 = ǫ for all j, k. Also,
it is easy to see that, provided (r − 1)ǫ < 1 (which we
assume), the maximum of 〈Q〉w is attained when S2 and
S3 are simultaneously maximised. (Geometrically, the
largest possible eigenvalue of Q arises when the vij bunch
as closely as possible, and then the corresponding eigen-
vector is the sum of the vij .) We thus have that
〈Q〉w ≤ 1 + (r − 1)ǫ .
More generally, since any state ρ can be written as a
mixture of pure states, we have for all states
Tr(ρQ) ≤ 1 + (r − 1)ǫ . (5)
In other words,
pi1 + . . .+ pir ≤ 1 + (r − 1)ǫ , (6)
and for any fixed r, this can be made as close to 1 as
desired by choosing θ suitably small.
So, if A is determined to reveal a bit string from some
finite set of size r, her scope for cheating is limited to in-
creasing the probability of revealing any given element of
the set by a fixed amount. For any fixed r, that amount
can be made arbitrarily small by choosing the security
parameters appropriately. If B’s concern is to prevent
cheating of this type, for some predetermined r, the pro-
tocol can guarantee him security.
Security against B: Holevo’s theorem implies
that the information about the N ≈ Cn bit string acces-
sible to B is at most logn bits.
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V. DISCUSSION
The bit string commitment protocols above use the
properties of quantum information to guarantee strong
levels of security to both the committer and receiver.
They highlight another cryptographic application of
quantum information: no (non-relativistic) classical pro-
tocol can guarantee such security. They also highlight
the fact that quantum cryptography can introduce dis-
tinctions between tasks which are classically equivalent,
such as bit commitment and bit string commitment.
As a metaphor for the cryptographic uses of bit string
commitment — in particular, of the second type of pro-
tocol — consider a situation in which A knows the com-
bination to a lock, wants to be able to prove to B in
future that she knows it now, but does not want to
give B the ability to open the lock now. If she sends
a bit string commitment of the combination now, she
can prove her present knowledge later by opening the
commitment. However, B, who can only get partial in-
formation about the committed string, will not be able
to deduce the combination from it. If the combination is
sufficiently long, the security parameters for the bit string
commitment are appropriately chosen, and A knows how
fast B can try possible combinations, she can ensure that
B remains sufficiently ignorant about the combination to
be almost certainly unable to break the lock during some
fixed interval of her choice.
As another illustration, suppose that A has just ob-
tained a very high resolution image of something of in-
terest to, but kept secret from, B. She may wish to be
able to prove to B later that she had the image today —
so that he will take her seriously enough to purchase her
services in future — without revealing too much detailed
information to B for free. A quantum bit string commit-
ment protocol with suitable parameters could meet this
need.
One might think that both these applications could
also be implemented securely classically, simply by al-
lowing B to choose a random subset of the combination
or image and asking A to provide the data correspond-
ing to that subset. However, this would persuade B only
that A is able to compute or obtain a dataset of the size
of the subset. She might be able to do this with a device
that extracts the combination digit by digit, or with an
imaging device of restricted field, without actually being
able to obtain all the data at the time she claims to have
it.
More generally, bit string commitment allows a sort of
partial knowledge proof, in which A can establish to B
her possession of some information — the factorisation of
a number, the proof of a theorem, . . .— while restricting
the amount of information B can obtain. It also illus-
trates the general possibility in quantum cryptography
of iterating a protocol a number of times with a partial
security guarantee that allows the parties to be certain
that many or most of the bits involved are appropriately
controlled. Practical cryptographic applications that re-
quire bit commitment almost always involve strings of
bits, and perfect security of the entire string may often
not be essential. Moreover, quantum bit string commit-
ment can be used on top of classical bit commitment
schemes, offering an extra layer of classically unobtain-
able security with a partial but unconditional security
guarantee. It thus seems likely to be rather useful.
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